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particularly so when such policy is the product of a "federal public policy"
declared as legislation, the express purpose of which is to promote labor
organization.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the utilization of the injunctive device
to deny unions the right to picket on shopping center property is not an
abridgement of the constitutionally guaranteed right of freedom of speech.
Since the Vogt decision, it is not doubted that prohibitions against picketing
will be sustained where the manner in which the picketing is conducted or
the attainment 'of the picketing objective would prevent effectuation of a
state's public policy formulated pursuant to a valid exercise of its police
power.28 Certainly, a policy protecting the integrity of a non -employer's
property rights is such a valid public objective, 23 and is not such a choice,
as between the competing interests of the union and of the property owner,
as to be "so inconsistent with rooted traditions of a free people" 3° as to be
unconstitutional.
VINCENT A. SIANO
Corporations—Entity Theory—Derivative Actions—Pro Rata Indi-
vidual Recovery.—Sblensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp. 1—In a
prior action, minority shareholders brought a derivative suit against the
corporation's directors. The trial court decided for the plaintiffs, and ordered
an accounting from the defendant directors of transactions which led to
corporate losses. On appeal, the intermediate appellate court reversed. Plain-
tiffs then appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois which reversed the
intermediate decision and reinstated the trial court's decree for an account-
ing. On remand, the trial court ordered an accounting which, however,
was never made since both sides agreed to a compromise whereby the de-
fendants agreed to buy the shares of the minority holders at five times their
value, and to pay all legal and court costs. At this point, a third party,
owner of forty-five shares, petitioned to intervene on grounds that the com-
promise imperiled an adequate recovery on the part of the corporation.
The court denied the petition and approved the compromise. The instant
case is the petitioner's appeal, in which, Burke, P. J., dissenting, it was
HELD• The lower court erred in approving the compromise inasmuch as it
varied from the Supreme Court's order for an accounting, and in denying
the intervenor's petition inasmuch as his ownership of forty-five shares gave
28 "Today, the Court signs the formal surrender .... State courts and state legisla-
tures are free to decide whether to permit or suppress any particular picket line for any
reason other than a blanket policy against all picketing.. . ." Teamsters Union v. Vogt,
Inc., supra note 10, at 297 (dissenting opinion). See Jones, The Right To Picket—
Twilight Zone of the Constitution, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 995 (1954).
29 "[A] state, in enforcing some public policy, whether of its criminal or civil law,
and whether announced by its legislature or its courts could constitutionally enjoin
peaceful picketing aimed at preventing effectuation of that policy." Teamsters Union v.
Vogt, Inc., supra note 10, at 293.
30 Supra note 16, at 479.
1 —III. App.—, 194 N.E.2d 35 (1963).
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him the requisite standing to enter the action to protect the-right of the
corporation to recover as opposed to the type of pro rata individual re-
covery found in the compromise.
This Illinois case is perhaps less noteworthy for its narrow procedural
compass than for the substantive issue, never realistically confronted by the
court, of pro rata individual recovery in derivative actions. This note, then,
looks to the status of such recovery both generally and in Illinois, placing
it in the context of the entity theory of corporations and the nature of
derivative action.
Never fond of formal metaphysics, lawyers tend to leave disputes con-
cerning the nature of corporate personality to their more philosophically
inclined brethren? Practical men, they have chosen to treat the corporation
as a real thing, an entity apart from its component members.' On this basis,
the concept of corporate personality serves as a
convenient figure of speech used to describe [the corporation] as
a legal unit, a separate concern with a capacity to hold property
and make contracts like a person, to sue and be sued and to con-
tinue to exist, notwithstanding changes of its shareholders or
members'
The claimed resemblance to the human person, however, is not total.
For while a living human being will rarely find his independent individuality
legally dispensed with, the state-created corporation at times finds its legal
personality disregarded for a number of reasons.' The basis for thus limiting
the extent of the entity theory of corporate personality rests on implicit
judicial realization that "despite its long history of entity, a corporation is
at bottom but an association of individuals united for a common purpose."'
When the common purpose tends to defeat social goods and is thus at odds
2 Metaphysical and jurisprudential problems arising from attempts to define the
philosophical nature of the corporation are exhaustively reviewed in 1 Fletcher, Cyclo-
pedia Corporations, 86 (rev. vol. 1963). Also see Dewey, Historic Background of
Corporate Legal Personality, 35 Yale L. J. 655 (1926), which traces the entity theory
back to the metaphysically rich thirteenth century; and 1 Hornstein, Corporation Law
and Practice 16 (1959) which quotes Bracton's analogy of the corporation to the
shepherd's flock which endures, despite the changes in its woolly personnel.
3 1 Fletcher, supra note 2, at 87.
4 Ballantine, Corporations 287 (rev. ed. 1946).
5 See Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 343, 352 (1947)
for summary of instances of disregard of corporate entity; 1 Fletcher, supra note 2, at
166; and O'Neal, 1 Close Corporations 21 (1958), who declares that
the separate personality of a corporation ( . . . whether . . . close or publicly
held) will be disregarded .. . whenever the corporate form is employed to
evade an obligation, . . . to perpetrate a fraud or crime, or to gain an unjust
advantage or commit an injustice.
Ballantine, however, disregards the language of disregarding the corporate entity:
The problems involved, however, are to be solved not by "disregarding" the '
corporate personality, but by a study of the just and reasonable limitations
upon the exercise of the privilege of separate capacity under particular circum-
stances in view of its proper use and functions.
Ballantine, supra note 4, at 292-3.
0 Berle, supra note 5, at 352.
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with the legal policy underlying the very creation of a corporation,' the
courts dispense with allegiance to a philosophic theory, and breach the wall
of entity in getting to the trouble within.
An example of such a disregard of the corporate entity arises in the
problem of pro rata individual recovery in shareholders' derivative actions.
Equity devised the derivative action, in which the plaintiff shareholders
represent the corporation, to protect the corporation in the event its officers
or directors fail to do so.° Thus, the right of action and the consequent re-
covery belong to the corporation in its status as a separate entity.° Further-
more, the social interest in protecting the rights of the corporation's creditors
provides another leg upon which the traditional restriction of recovery to
the corporation stands." The reason for this, of course, is to avoid de-
frauding creditors who might not have their just claims satisfied should the
courts allow the recovery realized to be distributed to individual members
of the corporation. The combination of entity theory 1 ' and protection of
creditors accounts for the "vast majority"" of cases holding that corporate
recovery is the only permissible outcome of a derivative action." Equitable
demands, however, have at times required relaxation of the rigors of an
entity-based concept of derivative action. Allowing individual pro rata re-
covery by the complainant minority is such an exception?'
When a corporate dispute ends with an agreement to liquidate, pro
rata distribution of assets is logically necessary, if only because no corpora-
7 Stevens, Private Corporations 96 (2d ed. 1949).
8 The American idea of allowing a derivative action has been traced to a dictum
of Chancellor Kent, in Attorney General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. *371 (N.Y.
1817). Cf. Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation, 32
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 980 (1957). Also, see Smith v. Hurd, 12 Metc. 371 (Mass. 1847) (lack
of privity between shareholder as individual and directors precludes any standing for
share-holders except as representatives of the corporation); Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp.
432 (N.D. Iowa 1946) (injury to corporate property grounds the action, not injury to
the individual). Also, 3 Pomeroy, Equity § 1095 (5th ed. 1941); 13 Fletcher, supra
note 2, at 641; Stevens, supra note 7, at 798; Ballantine, supra note 4, at 334.
9 Where, however, the wrong complained of against the directors does not affect
the corporation itself but touches an individual shareholder's interest, direct action in
the individual's own name is permitted. Cf. Ritchie v. McMullen, 79 Fed. 522 (6th Cir.
1897) . (directors intentionally allowed minority shareholder's stocks, which they held as
pledgees, to depreciate in value); Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919)
(majority shareholders reorganized corporation so as to eliminate minority holders,
although there was no discernible damage done to the corporation from the reorganiza-
tion). For an analysis of situations where the same action of the directors affects both
the corporation and the individual shareholder, see Ballantine, supra note 4, at 335.
to See Smith v. Hurd, supra note 8, at 385; also, Stevens, supra note 7, at 799.
11 Prunty, supra note 8, at 989 et seq., finds the original theoretical basis of the
derivative suit not to be contemporary "abstractions" about the corporate entity, but
rather the theory of a trust relationship between directors and shareholders. He indicates,
however, the later emphasis on the concept of entity which gradually predominated.
12 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1314 (1956).
13 The grounds on which a derivative action may be maintained are extensively
set out in Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460 (1881).
14 See Grenier, Pro Rata Recovery by Shareholders on Corporate Causes of Action
as a Means of Achieving Corporate Justice, 19 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 165 (1962).
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tion now exists capable of receiving the recovery." Some courts, however,
have broadened the permissibility of pro rata recovery so as to allow it
where a corporate recovery would unjustly benefit shareholders who partic-
ipated in, or assented to, the mismanagement giving rise to the action."
Thus, in Perlman v. Feldmann," the defendant, a former principal stock-
holder and director of the corporation, was required to account individually
to the minority shareholders for an excessive profit he made in selling his
majority shares to a new group of directors, in violation of his fiduciary
duty to all the shareholders. To have required corporate recovery in this
case would have been, in effect, a "kick-back" to the new purchasers of
control, a result not favored by the court.
In DiTanzasso v. Loverro,18 the New York court affirmed an individual
pro rata recovery in a derivative action. The decision rested on the ground
that the plaintiff was in reality the only party injured by the defendants'
activity. Since he was the only substantial stockholder other than the
defendants, to permit a corporate recovery would have the effect of benefit-
ting the latter. By contrast, the Delaware court, in Keenan v. Eshlemann,"
15 The parties in the instant case at first attempted to base their compromise
upon a discontinued liquidation procedure carried out in accordance with Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch. 32, § 157.90:
The liquidation of the assets and business of a corporation may be discon-
tinued at any time during the liquidation proceedings, in the following manner:
(a) If the action shall have been instituted by a shareholder and it is
made to appear to the court that the deadlock in the corporate
affairs has been broken or the management or control of the cor-
poration has been changed, the court, in its discretion, may dismiss
the proceedings and direct the receiver to redeliver to the corporation
all its remaining property and assets.
On the allowance of compromise settlements in derivative actions, and the restrictions
surrounding them, see N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 626(d):
Such [derivative] action shall not be . . . compromised . . . without the
approval of the court having jurisdiction of the action. If the court shall
determine that the interests of the shareholders or any class or rlagges thereof
will be substantially affected by such . . . compromise . . . , the court, in its
discretion, may direct that notice, by publication or otherwise, shall be given
to the shareholders or class or classes thereof whose interests it determines will
be so affected; if notice is so directed to be given, . . . expense [of the notice]
shall be awarded as special costs.
In the instant case, the compromise included plaintiff's counsel fees. The N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law § 626(e) expressly excludes the fees of counsel where the recovery is "for
the benefit of injured shareholders only and limited to a recovery" of their loss, i.e.,
where pro rata recovery is involved.
16 See 13 Fletcher, supra note 2, at 646; also, Grenier, supra note 14, passim.
17 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). Perlman rests
its allowance of pro rata recovery upon the theory of fiduciary responsibility of directors
to shareholders, recalling the view of this as the historically original theory of derivative
actions. Cf. Prunty, supra note 11. For a more recent treatment of fiduciary duty
governing the transfer of corporate control, see Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305
F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962), noted in 4 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 421 (1963) and
76 Ram L. Rev. 834 (1963).
18 250 App. Div. 206, 293 N.Y.S. 912 (1937), of/id, 276 N.Y. 551, 12 N.E.2d 570
(1937).
10 23 Del. Ch. 234, 2 A.2d 904 (1938).
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refused individual recovery to the plaintiffs, who alone had neither partici-
pated in nor assented to the defendants' wrongdoing. According to Keenan,
pro rata recovery would "encourage fraud," would not reflect "the inherent
nature of the wrong sought to be redressed," and would "weaken . . . a
stockholder's action to correct a corporate wrong." In the face of these
possibilities, the Delaware court declared its adherence to a policy of pre-
serving "the fiction of corporate entity," and thus restricting all recoveries
in derivative actions to the corporations themselves. 2°
In recent years, the rule in the Perlman case has met with cautious but
increasing approval. 2 ' Phrased most conservatively, the rule might be
stated thus: where allowance of corporate recovery would tend to benefit
those involved in the wrongdoing, as, for example, permitting them to share
in a dividend declared as a result of the recovery, then the court will at
least consider the possibility of pro rata recovery, thus disregarding the
corporate entity basis of the derivative action. Qualifying the rule, of
course, is the restriction that allowance of pro rata recovery can be justified
"only when the case is free from the complication of the claims of corporate
creditors."22
Pro rata recovery has a long history in Illinois, the situs of the instant
case. In 1897, in Brown v. DeYoung," the Illinois Supreme Court, in a per
curiam opinion incorporating that of the intermediate appellate court, held
that when the effect of a corporate recovery would be to benefit those who
were wrongdoers with respect to the injury which called forth the relief,
then the award should be made to the individual stockholders who were in-
nocent.24
 Five years later; however, in Chicago Macaroni Co. v. Boggiano,25
the court refused to permit a pro rata recovery and required the offending
director to reimburse the corporation itself for the amounts of salary he took
without warrant. The distinction between the cases seems to be in the court's
willingness in Brown to dispense with the demands of doctrinal consistency
vis-k-vis strict entity theory, and to favor a pro rata recovery under a more
flexible concept of equity. The problem appeared again in Voorhees v.
Mason," in which, relying on what appears to be a formalistic criterion, the
court refused pro rata recovery on the grounds that the plaintiff's bill had
20 Id. at 253, 2 A.2d at 912.
21 See Grenier, supra note 14, and 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1314, supra note 12.
22 Stevens, supra note 7, at 797.
28 167 III. 549, 47 N.E. 863 (1897).
24 Emphasizing the equitable nature of the action, the Brown court declared:
[Elquity, disregarding forms, and being observant only of requiring that to be
done which is right, might be completely satisfied with the simpler requirement
that the moneys to which the deserving shareholders are entitled should be
paid directly to them.
Pointing out the lack of specific authority in the area, the court went on:
ETThe lengthening reach of equity into the manifold intricacies of modern business
should not be drawn back simply for lack of authoritative decision to guide
us, where reason and every equitable consideration point the way with so much
clearness.
Id. at 558, 47 N.E. at 866.
25 202 M. 312, 67 N.E. 17 (1903).
26 245 In. 256, 91 N.E. 1056 (1910).
777
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL. AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
not called for it, with the implication that henceforth in Illinois derivative
actions would follow the rule of Chicago Macaroni rather than that of
Brown." Despite the official frown on pro rata recovery in Illinois, a recent
decision indicates that that state might in the future be forced to look more
tolerantly upon it as a solution in some instances. In Duncan v. National
Tea Co.," the court, on the one hand, stressed the traditional concept that
the individual has no standing in a derivative action except as a representa-
tive of the corporation. It went on to note, however, that shareholders
who had participated in the activities causing injury to the corporation
should be precluded from sharing in any way in benefits accruing from
corporate recovery. It is conceivable that pro rata individual recovery could
be, at times, the only satisfactory solution to an originally derivative action,
especially in small dose corporations where perhaps only one or two share-
holders are innocent of involvement in the wrongdoing.
As far as can be seen from the tangled skein of facts in the instant case,
allowance of pro rata recovery, in the form of the compromise settlement,
would adequately conclude this action. The only objection to the compromise
comes from an intervenor who has a foot in both camps. He claims standing
on the basis of his ownership of forty-five shares in his own name. In addi-
tion to this, however, he controlled a forty percent interest in a partnership
owning ninety-two percent of the majority holdings. His now deceased
partner was one of the delinquent directors, and, as the dissent, on rehearing,
points out, his status as a surviving partner obliges him to discharge partner-
ship liabilities, including this one."
While the intervenor can validly claim the technical status of a minority
holder representing the corporation, his long silence during the course of
this decade of litigation, coupled with his allegation of the continuance of the
partnership responsibilities in another recently decided case," tips the equi-
ties against him. Since derivative actions are equity proceedings controlled
by the court's discretion, denial of the intervenor's petition deprives him
not of a right, but of an equitable forum which his ambiguous position does
not appear to warrant. To permit an intervenor possessing such doubtful
credentials to obstruct pro rata recovery in a situation which seems clearly
to call for it appears to be a needlessly formalistic foreshortening of that
"lengthening reach of equity" into complex business activities which the
Illinois court once found so desirable."' ROBERT J. MULDOON, JR.
Corporations—Liability of Directors—Illegal Stock Issue.—Bay State
York Co. v. Cobb.'—This is an action brought by a creditor to establish the
indebtedness of the defendant-directors of a Massachusetts corporation
27 The briefs in the instant case discuss Brown as if the Voorhees decision had
no importance for the Brown rule.
28 14 III. App. 2d 280, 144 N.E.2d 771 (1957).
29 Shlensky v. South Parkway Building Corp., supra note 1, at 43.
SO Englestein v. Mackie, 35 Ill. App. 2d 276, 182 N.E.2d 351 (1962).
31 Brown v. DeYoung, supra note 23, at 558, 47 N.E. at 866.
1 	 Mass. —, 195 N.E.2d 328 (1964).
778
